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Against the background of the subprime crisis, and in the face of re-cent fears over the debt levels of Western governments, China ap-pears to be a pole of stability, and the general state of its public fi-
nances a source of envy rather than fear. And yet, problems of local author-
ity debt are now on the political agenda of the Chinese central authorities,
since they are beginning to give rise to a certain anxiety. For example, on
23 June 2010, following an enquiry by the National Audit Office (審計署 –
shenji shu ), Auditor-General Liu Jiayi declared to the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress that local authority debt had reached
significant proportions, that repaying it could already, in a certain number
of cases, pose a problem, and that it was therefore creating a real risk (ar-
ticle 4). According to different – partial and vague – forecasts and esti-
mates, the debt of Chinese local authorities has now risen to more than
10,000 billion yuan – that is to say, 150 percent of their annual budgetary
revenue.
This increase has been gradual (article 1). Still very low in 2000, local
debt increased significantly until the mid-2000s, reaching 4,000 billion
yuan in 2007. The policy of budgetary support that was decided in the face
of the international economic crisis then caused it to increase very rapidly,
rising to the current figure of 10,000 billion yuan. This debt holds a Sword
of Damocles over the Chinese economy in the shape of a debt crisis of the
kind that hit Southeast Asia in the late 1990s and that has affected West-
ern countries over the last two years (article 1).
Over and above the sums involved, the essential problem of this debt is
that it is at the limits of legality and therefore largely out of the control of
central government. Indeed, the Budget Bill (預算法 – yusuan fa ) currently
in force does not allow local governments to be in a position of deficit and
therefore to get into debt (article 6). A relaxation of this rule has taken
place in the last two years: as part of the plan for the support of the econ-
omy set up to tackle the international crisis, the state has authorised local
authorities to borrow 400 billion yuan through the Ministry of Finance (財
政部 – caizheng bu ); that is to say, the Ministry has been authorised to
issue debt obligations for funds intended for local authorities.
If these 400 billion yuan constitute only a minimal proportion of the real
debt of local governments, it is because the latter have found roundabout
ways of financing their deficits (article 2). “Local investment platforms” (地
方融資平台 – difang rongzi pingtai ) in particular have mushroomed. These
investment companies issue debt obligations used by local governments.
These obligations are, to a greater or lesser degree, guaranteed by the local
authorities and are therefore known under the name of “quasi-municipal
bonds” (城投債 – chengtouzhai ). (3) According to a survey carried out by
the Banking Regulatory Commission (銀監會 – yinjianhui ), Chinese banks
loaned these platforms nearly 8,000 billion yuan in mid-2010 (article 3).
However, these finance platforms are beginning to arouse certain suspi-
cions (article 4). The financial rating agency Lianhe recently placed the ob-
ligations issued by two of them on the list of ratings under surveillance (信
用評級觀察名單 – xinyong pingji guancha mingdan ), a very rare decision.
A growing number of authorities seem, in fact, to be facing repayment dif-
ficulties (article 4). The county of Shache (莎車縣 ) in the Province of Xin-
jiang was the first example of default, in late 2009. A survey of 18 provincial
governments, 16 municipalities, and 36 counties carried out during the first
six months of 2010 by the National Audit Office showed that for seven, ten,
and 14 of them, respectively, the amount of debt exceeded their annual tax
revenues (article 2), and almost half of the local authorities examined in the
survey had to repay their debts by obtaining new loans (借新還舊 – jiexin
huanjiu ). All these symptoms point to a difficult situation.
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3. 城投債 (chengtouzhai ) is the abbreviation of 城市投資債券 (chengshi touzi zhaiquan), literally “obliga-
tory municipal investment loans.” These are debt obligations that are issued unofficially rather than of-
ficially, and they are guaranteed by the municipal authorities to enable them to contract a debt. They
are therefore now translated into English as quasi-municipal bonds.
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Conscious of the danger of a major credit crisis erupting, the Chinese
government decided to first of all implement a vast campaign to audit
local debt (article 1). The enquiry was formally launched by a circular from
the general office of the State Council (國務院辦公廳 – guowuyuan ban-
gongting ) on 13 February 2011, and its objectives were stated in a work
plan published on the same date. It began on 1 March 2011 and will cover
all local governments at the provincial, municipal, and county level. Al-
though such campaigns have existed since 1997, this one stands out by
virtue of its scope. All governments down to the county level must be in-
spected, and all types of financial commitments, notably those contracted
through the intermediary of the “local investment platforms,” must be
taken into account. Both the amount and structure of these debts must be
stated, and means of containing and reducing them must be identified. The
aim of the central government is to clarify (清理 – qingli ) this debt – that
is, to obtain a complete and exhaustive vision of it in order to be able to
reduce it (化解 – huajie ).
Although the wish of the central government to clarify the local debt sit-
uation is welcome, since its extent and precise structure remain unclear,
the means of remedying the situation have not yet been clearly defined.
A first measure, already accepted by the National People’s Congress and
currently under discussion by the State Council (article 6), would be to re-
view the Budget Bill with a view to authorising local authorities to borrow
directly without having to go through the Ministry of Finance as is cur-
rently the case. It would therefore be useless to turn to indirect forms of
borrowing such as “local investment platforms,” which are now making the
identification, and therefore the evaluation, of local financial conditions
particularly difficult. Details of this amendment to the Budget Bill autho-
rising the issue of local debt have not yet been determined, notably with
regard to the role of the central government, the constraints on local fi-
nances, and the conditions of indebtedness. However, according to an ex-
pert participating in discussions on the reform of the Budget Bill (article 6),
preliminary experiments could take place in the near-term. Certain devel-
oped localities in the coastal provinces might therefore find themselves
authorised to issue their own debt obligations directly, thereby initiating
the process of gradually extending this new freedom.
However, this first measure, although welcome, does not solve the basic
problem, that is to say, the causes of this exponential growth in local debt.
Briefly mentioned in the articles that make up the report in Xin Shiji, the
debts are not the subject of a thorough study or of any particular attention
on the part of the central government. However, as Ni Hongri from the
State Council’s Development Research Centre notes, this local debt crisis is
merely the manifestation of a crisis in local finance (article 4). Indeed, it
was when the central government asked local authorities, particularly in
rural areas, to set up a compulsory, nine-year education system for all (普
九 – pujiu ) that the first local debts appeared (article 1). Since the 1990s,
moreover, the Chinese government has been committed to a policy of re-
centralising its tax revenues and imposing strict control over local budget-
ary revenue, whilst delegating much of the provision of public and social
services to local authorities. The transfer of power from central to local au-
thorities has not been sufficient to cover the deficits that have gradually
appeared. The Chinese government seems reluctant to tackle this problem
for the time being, and although the heralded review of the Budget Bill will
be beneficial, it is to be feared that it will attack consequences rather than
causes.
z Translated by Elizabeth Guill
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